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PARTS ONE AND TWO
In this discussion there will be no section-by-section comment.
Such a task is performed by the comments in the 1962 official text
of the Code, and by the North Carolina Annotations to the Code
prepared under the direction of the Legislative Council. Instead
some of the important aspects of the new legislation contained in
Article 9 will be discussed.
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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I. COVERAGE OF THE ARTICLE
Article 9 deals with secured transactions. It applies to any
transaction, regardless of form, which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures, including goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract
rights.' The article also applies to any sale of accounts, contract
rights or chattel paper.2 The present discussion, however, is con-
cerned with security. The application of Article 9 is to security
interests created by contract, specifically including pledge, assign-
ment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equip-
ment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention
contract and lease or consignment intended as security.' Expressly
excluded from the application of the article are statutory liens,
4
except for the section of Article 9 concerning priority of a possessory
lien for services or materials furnished with respect to goods subject
to a security interest.5 Further express exclusions are contained in
a separate section6 and include, among others, a landlord's lien, an
equipment trust covering railway rolling stock, a transfer of an
interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance, creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate save for fixtures, and
transfers of any tort claim, or any deposit, savings, passbook or
like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association,
credit union or like organization.
II. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE LAW
Article 9 is no mere collection of changes made in the present
law concerning security on personal property. It is a reorganiza-
tion and rewriting of such law. Although numerous existing secur-
ity devices are, as pointed out above, included in the coverage of
the article, that does not mean that there are separate provisions
relating to each as such, as is true in the present law. Instead
1 G.S. § 25-9-102(l)(a).
2 G.S. § 25-9-102(1) (b).
8G.S. § 25-9-102(2). A surety's right to subrogation is not included
as a security interest. Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d
49 (1965). Leases intended as security will be discussed hereinafter.
'G.S. § 25-9-102(2). The Code itself provides liens for warehousemen,
G.S. §§ 25-7-209, -210 and carriers, §§ 25-7-307, -308, and a security interest
for collecting banks, § 25-4-208.
:G.S. §§ 25-9-102(2), -310.
C G.S. § 25-9-104.
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provisions are made for secured transactions, and these provisions
apply to these various kinds of transaction, such as mortgage, con-
ditional sale, trust receipt, etc., without regard to the separate forms
that the transactions may take. They all come under the same pro-
visions of the article. There are, however, provisions relating to
the situation in which the secured party has possession of the
collateral.
Not only are old forms of security transactions of no conse-
quence for the purposes of the law set forth in the article, but the
old terminology used in connection with these forms disappears. No
such words as "mortgage," "mortgagor" or "mortgagee" are used
to designate the inclusive kind of transaction with which the Code
deals or the parties thereto. This was done deliberately in order
to forestall the danger that if any of the old terms were used courts
might import into the Code for the interpretation of its provisions
some of the existing law clustering about those terms instead of
looking to the rules and provisions laid down in the Code itself.7
The new terms for the inclusive kind of transaction covered and
the parties thereto are defined. A general definition section of the
Code, defining "security interest," reads in part, "' Security interest'
means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation."8 A definition section
contained in and relating to Article 9 provides, "'Security agree-
ment' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest." " 'Collateral' means the property subject to a security
interest . . ... 10 As to the parties it is provided, " 'Debtor' means
the person who owes payment or other performance of the obliga-
tion secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collat-
eral . . . . Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are
not the same person, the term 'debtor' means the owner of the
collateral in any provision of the article dealing with the collateral,
the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may
G.S. § 25-9-105, comment 1. In Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., v. Queenan,
344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961), the court pointed out that the Code
represents an entirely new approach especially as to security transactions,
and that so far as possible the meaning of the law should be gathered from
the Code unfettered by anachronisms indigenous to the respective jurisdic-
tions.
a G.S. § 25-1-201(37). The section contains forty-six definitions appli-
cable in the Code generally.0G.S. § 25-9-105(1)(h).
10 G.S. § 25-9-105(1)(c).
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include both where the context so requires."" "'Secured party'
means a lender ... or other person in whose favor there is a secur-
ity interest .... "12
In short, instead of the old terms such as "mortgage" or "con-
ditional sale," etc., the Code uses the inclusive term, "security agree-
ment"; in place of "mortgagor" or "conditional vendee," etc., the
Code uses the inclusive term "debtor"; and instead of "mortgagee"
or "conditional vendor," etc., the Code uses the words "secured
party."
This does not mean that the old forms of transaction such as
mortgage13 or conditional sale can no longer be used; on the con-
trary, as above indicated, the Code specifies that it applies to secur-
ity interests created by these existing forms of bargain,'4 thus mak-
ing it clear that their use may continue, 5 although the results
under the Code no longer depend on the form. The cases examined
by the writer decided under the Code in jurisdictions which have
adopted it involved the existing and familiar forms of security
transaction and their consequences under Code provisions. In the
course of time forms of transaction especially adapted to the Code
will probably become common, but it is obvious that meanwhile
prudent lawyers and businessmen are sticking to the familiar forms.
Moreover, it is to be noted that transactions entered into before
the effective date of the Code, which in North Carolina is July 1,
1967, are governed by the old law.' 6
By bringing security agreements of many kinds under the same
provisions of the Code, much of the useless complexity in the pre-
viously existing law is eliminated. A great number of decisions and
statutes hitherto related to particular kinds of security transactions,
and a separate body of law existed as to each with great and need-
less variations in the law from one transaction to another. For
example, conditional sales were distinguished from chattel mort-
gages, and a separate body of law developed concerning each.1
The making of legal distinctions between conditional sales and pur-
22 G.S. § 25-9-105(1) (d).
1
- G.S. § 25-9-105(1) (i).8 North Carolina has an optional statutory form for a chattel mortgage.
N.C. GiN. STAT. § 45-1 (1950). This statute is not specifically repealed by
G.S. § 25-10-102.
"I G.S. § 25-9-102(2).
'1 G.S. § 25-9-101. comment.
' G.S. § 25-10-102(2).
"'VOLD, SALES 326 (2d ed. 1959).
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chase-money chattel mortgages was criticized on the ground that
although the forms of the two transactions were different the result
accomplished was the same."8 In North Carolina it has been de-
cided that a conditional sale has the legal effect of a chattel mort-
gage.1" Accordingly, although the Code will make a large scale
change in the law of most other states by eliminating the difference
between conditional sales and chattel mortgages," the North Caro-
lina law will be unchanged in this particular.
Detailed statutes often provided for and governed one particular
kind of security transaction, such as, in North Carolina, an agri-
cultural lien for advances,21 an assignment of accounts receivable,22
a factor's lien,23 or a trust receipt;24 but since these devices are all
brought under the provisions of the Code as "security agreements,"
these statutes will no longer be necessary and are repealed.25
In the past as new security devices were generated out of com-
mercial life new bodies of law grew up concerning the particular
device. A good illustration is the trust receipt. Its nature, require-
ments and legal consequences were the subject of many conflicting
decisions. The trust receipt was variously "classified as a condition-
al sale, a chattel mortgage, a consignment for sale, a reservation of
title, a pledge, a bailment, and as a principal-agency relationship;
however, many courts have held it to be a security device sui
generis."' 20 In North Carolina the trust receipt transaction, whether
a two-party27 or a three-party transaction,28 was treated as a con-
" Bogert, The Evolution of Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8
CORNELL L.Q. 303, 304 (1923).
1" State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1933); The Observer
Co. v. Little, 175 N.C. 42, 94 S.E. 526 (1917); G.S. § 25-9-102, N.C.
comment.
"In United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 892
(W.D. Ark. 1964), the court pointed out that it was no longer required
to decide whether the transaction was a conditional sale or a chattel mort-
gage, which would have been important under prior Arkansas law, but that
under UCC § 9-102 both forms are included.
"t N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-52 to -64 (Supp. 1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-79 to -85 (1950), 44-77 to -78 (Supp. 1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §8 44-70, -76 (Supp. 1965).
4 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-46 to -66 (Supp. 1965).
'
0 G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
0 Carter, The Truest Receipt and the Problem of Recordation or Notice
Filing, 1951 WAsHi. U.L.Q. 30, 37.
7 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 253 N.C. 100, 116 S.E.2d
491 (1960).




ditional sale. Eventually much of this law was superseded by the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 29 But the law which developed with
regard to trust receipts, some of which was excellent and would have
been valuable for other forms of security also, related to trust re-
ceipts and not, for example, to factor's liens. It is hoped that in
the future the Code will preclude any such complicated device-by-
device development of the law by making the Code provisions
sufficiently inclusive so that newly generated devices may come under
its terms as "security agreements."30
The Code does not state whether the title to the collateral is
in the secured party or whether it is in the debtor. Otherwise put,
it does not adopt either the title theory or the lien theory. Instead
Article 9 specifies, "Each provision of this article with regards (sic
in N.C. statute, "regard" in 1962 Official Text) to rights, obliga-
tions and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured
party or in the debtor."131
This, of course, is a departure from existing theory in North
Carolina and the other American jurisdictions. As to mortgages
on real estate, the country is divided into "title jurisdictions," in
which title to the land passes to the mortgagee when the mortgage
is executed, "lien jurisdictions" in which the mortgage gives the
mortgagee only a lien and no title passes under the mortgage until
foreclosure; and intermediate jurisdictions where title goes to the
mortgagee on default. 2 However, the courts are not consistent in
carrying out the theory as to the location of title. For example, in
title states the theory that the mortgagee has title would logically
dictate that the mortgagee's wife would have dower, and that the
mortgagor's wife would have no dower in his interest. Actually
the law -was just the reverse. The mortgagor's wife had dower in
his interest,3 and the mortgagee's wife had none. 4 For numerous
other purposes the mortgagor's interest, although he does not have
title, has been treated as real estate, and the mortgagee's interest
"gN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-46 to -66 (Supp. 1965), which is in turn
superseded, as already stated, by the Code. G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
"o G.S. § 25-9-101, comment.
31 G.S. § 25-9-202.
2 Durfee, The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage-Some Gen-
eralizations, 10 MIcE. L. REV. 587 n.3 (1912).
' Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 194, 119 S.E. 210, 211 (1923)
(dictum); Wilkins v. French, 20 Me. 111 (1841); WALSHr, MORTGAGES 25
(1934).
" WALSH, MORTGAGES 25 (1934).
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as personal property, notwithstanding his title to the real estate.85
Nevertheless the title theory is by no means all mere theory. One
important consequence is that, in the absence of any agreement or
implication to the contrary, the mortgagee in a title jurisdiction
has the right to possession, even before default," whereas in a lien
jurisdiction the mortgagor has that right . 7
The fact that a jurisdiction was a lien jurisdiction as to real
estate mortgages did not mean that it was also a lien jurisdiction
as to chattel mortgages. The lien jurisdictions were more numerous
in the case of real estate than of chattel mortgages.38  North Caro-
lina has been a title jurisdiction as to both,"9 with the result that
in the case of chattel mortgages also the mortgagee has had the
right to possession before as well as after default.4"
As to security interests in personal property, the imposing body
of law and learning related to the title and lien theories will largely
be put away in the attic of legal history. It is true that the parties
can use the old forms of bargain if they want to, and the old forms
may under existing law result in title being in the debtor or the
secured party. This in turn may have a bearing on matters not
covered by the Code, such as the incidence of taxation.4
But although there will be simplification of the law by sweeping
away, so far as the results covered by the Code are concerned,
differences in the law depending on the form of the bargain, a new
set of variations is introduced by the Code. Under it some results
vary, not with the form of the bargain, but with the kind of collat-
eral. Certain sections state special rules regarding particular types
of collateral. These types are accounts and contract rights, chattel
paper, documents and instruments, general intangibles, and goods.
Goods are in turn subdivided into consumer goods, equipment, farm
"Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923); WALSH,
MORTGAGES 25 (1934).
"8 Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N.C. 234, 95 S.E. 491 (1918) (semble);
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 306 (1951).
" OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 311 (1951).
"8 1 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 1 (Bowers
ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
"°Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N.C. 234, 95 S.E. 491 (1918) (real
estate) ; Hinson v. Smith, 118 N.C. 503, 24 S.E. 541 (1896) (chattels).
, Hinson v. Smith, supra note 39; Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N.C. 27, 32 S.E.
317 (1899). A discussion of this aspect of secured transactions under the
Code will appear hereinafter.
,1 G.S. § 25-9-101, comment.
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products, and inventory.42 Distinctions are designed to follow func-
tional rather than formal lines.4
It is obvious that lawyers dealing with matters covered by
Article 9 will find it necessary to become familiar with the Code
meanings of a considerable number of new terms, as well as with
a reorganized body of law incorporating a new approach. In time,
new headings and classifications will doubtless appear in reports,
digests and treatises, and also in law school courses.
III. ARTICLE 9 SUBORDINATED TO CERTAIN STATUTES
Not all the existing statutes relating to matters within Article
9 are repealed. Article 9 provides that a transaction, although sub-
ject to Article 9, is also subject to the North Carolina Consumer
Finance Act, General Statutes sections 53-164 through 53-191 (gov-
erning small loans), to General Statutes section 24-1 (prescribing
six per cent as the legal interest rate), to section 24-2 (usury
statute), and to sections 91-1 through 91-8 (pawnbrokers). In case
of conflict between the provisions of Article 9 and those of any such
statute, the latter prevail. Failure to comply with any applicable
statute has only the effect specified therein.44
In addition, there is a provision in Article 9 that nothing therein
validates any charge or practice illegal under any statute or regula-
tion thereunder governing usury, small loans, retail installment sales,
or the like, or extends the application of the statute or regulation to
any transaction not otherwise subject thereto.45
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY AGREEMENTS
One of the most important changes in the law brought about by
Article 9 is the replacing of formal requirements for the various
kinds of security transactions with a set of simple requirements for
a security agreement. The requirements are that the debtor sign a
security agreement which contains a description of the collateral and,
in addition, when the security interest covers crops or oil, gas, or
' G.S. § 25-9-102, comment 5. There an index of sections stating special
rules relating to the particular varieties of collateral is set forth. These
terms for the kinds of collateral are defined in G.S. § 25-9-105 and sections
there referred to.
,G.S. § 25-9-101, comment.
"G.S. § 25-9-203(2).
' G.S. § 25-9-201.
1966]
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minerals to be extracted or timber to be cut, a description of the
land concerned." Thus, where land is not involved, the require-
ments come down to four, that there be a security agreement of
some sort,47 that it be in writing (the debtor could not sign an
unwritten one), that the debtor sign it, and that it describe the
collateral. That these minimum requirements must be met, save
when the collateral is in the possession of the secured party,48 is
made plain by the language that otherwise a security interest is
not enforceable against the debtor or third parties.
In this particular a change is introduced in North Carolina law.
A chattel mortgage on a tractor has been held to be valid and en-
forceable against the mortgagors although the chattel-mortgage in-
strument was unsigned.49 Indeed no writing at all was necessary;
a verbal mortgage was, prior to the Code, valid and enforceable
against the mortgagors5 ° No possession in the mortgagee was
necessary to the validity of the oral mortgage." Oral conditional
sales also were binding between the parties. 2 The North Carolina
decisions were in accord with the common-law rule that a valid
mortgage of personal property could be made without a writing
and without delivery of possession.83
The simple requirements for a security agreement replace the
requirements hitherto prescribed by statute for particular varieties
of security such as agricultural liens for advances, 4 assignments of
accounts receivable, 5 factor's liens," and trust receipts.5  When
such devices are used, their creation is tested by the simple Code
requirements of security agreement, writing, signature of the debtor,
and description of the collateral.5
' G.S. § 25-9-203(1) (b).
&7 It is to be recalled that "security agreement" simply means an agree-
ment which creates or provides for a security interest. G.S. § 25-9-
105 (1) (h).
"G.S. § 25-9-203(1) (a). This means that where the collateral is in
the creditor's possession no writing is necessary. This was true at common
law. G.S. § 25-9-203, comment 3. A familiar example is the pledge.
"Kearns v. Davis Bros., 186 N.C. 522, 120 S.E. 52 (1923).
r' Odom v. Clark, 146 N.C. 544, 60 S.E. 513 (1908) ; McCoy v. Lassiter,
95 N.C. 88 (1886).
McCoy v. Lassiter, 95 N.C. 88 (1886).
Butts v. Screws, 95 N.C. 215 (1886).
1 JoNEs § 2.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §9 44-52, -62 (Supp. 1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §9 44-77, -78 (Supp. 1965).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 (1950), -71 (Supp. 1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-47 (Supp. 1965).
Trust receipts were held to meet the requirements of UCC § 9-
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Technical requirements for chattel mortgages existing in some
states such as acknowledgment and affidavits of good faith are
abandoned, 9 thus simplifying the task of preparing a security agree-
ment which will be valid in the various states having the Code.
The Code requirement that there be a security agreement arose
in a case in which a debtor corporation made a note to a partner-
ship, and the debtor and the partner creditors as secured parties
signed and filed a financing statement." Such a filing is the recorda-
tion requirement of Article 9. The statement named the collateral
as tools and dies of the debtor. The statement did not contain a
grant of a security interest, but there was testimony that the debtor
intended to grant such an interest. The court held that the partner-
ship creditor did not have a security interest valid in the debtor's
receivership. A financing statement which does not contain the
debtor's grant of a security interest cannot serve as a security agree-
ment."1
One of the requisites for a "security agreement" is, as stated
above, a description of the collateral, and when the security interest
covers crops or oil, gas or minerals to be extracted or timber to
be cut, a description of the land concerned. As to what is required
by way of description, it is provided that for the purposes of Article
9 "any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is de-
scribed." 2 This is designed to eliminate the requirement in some
of the older chattel-mortgage cases that descriptions must be exact
and detailed.6" The Code test of the sufficiency of the description,
namely that it reasonably identifies what is described, "is substan-
tially in accord with existing North Carolina law."" A description
in a chattel mortgage, "1948 Auto-Car (Sleeper Cab Tractor)
Motor No. " was held sufficient in this state when the mort-
gagor owned only one tractor. 5 The description did identify the
203 (1) (b) for a valid security agreement since they were written agree-
ments, signed by the debtor, granted security interests in collateral, and
contained a description of the collateral. It re United Thrift Stores, Inc.,
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965).
" G.S. § 25-9-203, comment 1.
" The requisites for a financing statement are provided by G.S. § 25-9-
402.
" American Card Co., Inc. v. H. M. H. Co., 196 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1963).
8 G.S. § 25-9-110.
G.S. § 25-9-110, comment.
O"G.S. § 25-9-110, N.C. comment.
" Peek v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 745 (1955).
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tractor even though the motor number was not given. Another
description in a conditional sale was "One S. H. coup6 No.
Model T." S. H. was an abbreviation for second hand. The vendee
owned only this one automobile. The court held the description
valid and referred to the North Carolina rule that the description
is sufficient if it will enable third parties, aided by inquiries which
the instrument suggests, to identify the property.66 In North Caro-
lina if the mortgaged property is described as a certain number of
designated articles, for example "two horses," or "two wagons,"
the description is valid if the mortgagor has only two horses or
two wagons, but invalid if he has more.17 These North Carolina
decisions would seem to be equally valid under the Code. The same
could not be said of a decision involving a conditional sale in which
the property was described as "one bay mule," whereas it was a
black mule. The security was held to be valid against a purchaser
from the conditional vendee since the parties to the conditional sale
intended the security to be on the particular mule and the intention
will not be defeated by a false description.6" Certainly the descrip-
tion did not reasonably identify what was described and therefore
would fail to meet the Code test.
In a case decided under the Code the description in a chattel
mortgage was:
"1-2 pc. living room suite, wine
1-5 pc. chrome dinette set, yellow
1-3 pc. panel bedroom suite, lime oak, matt. & spgs."
This description was held sufficient against the mortgagor's trustee
in bankruptcy over the objection that various articles could make
up a set, for example, a five-piece dinette set could be a table and
four chairs, or a table, a cabinet and three chairs.69 But the court
pointed out that the property was located at the address of the mort-
gagors and in their possession, therefore the description, assisted
by external evidence that does not add to or contradict the terms
of the mortgage would enable a third party to identify the mort-
"Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E.
461 (1929).
CT Forehand v. Edenton Farmers' Co., 206 N.C. 827, 175 S.E. 183 (1934);
Holman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 113, 25 S.E. 793 (1896); Spivey v. Grant,
96 N.C. 214, 2 S.E. 45 (1887).
"' Harris v. Woodward, 96 N.C. 232, 1 S.E. 544 (1887).
" In re Drane, 202 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
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gaged property, whatever the items in the set turned out to be.
Apparently the court assumed that the mortgagor had one set or
suite and only one which met each description and had no more
articles which might have created an alternative choice as to what
constituted a set. The reasoning of the court resembled that of the
North Carolina court in some of the description cases.
When a security interest covers crops, or oil, gas, or minerals to
be extracted, or timber to be cut, under the Code the security
interest must contain a description of the land concerned. 70 Previous
North Carolina cases established the same requirement for mort-
gages on crops.71 A crop lien was given on "all my entire crop
now growing or to be growing the present year, on my land, or
on any other land I may cultivate the present year," etc. The North
Carolina court held that this description was sufficiently certain as
to the debtor's land and the crops grown on it, but not as to any
other land and the crops grown thereon.72 The court reasoned that
the lands of the maker of the lien, when he executed it, could be
seen and known, but those he might cultivate thereafter could not.
This is a liberal decision as to the debtor's own land, since so far
as the description, "my own land," goes the land might be in Paki-
stan or Patagonia. Conversely, "land I may cultivate the present
year," could be definitely ascertained as soon as there were any
crops to be involved. However, whether right or wrong, the court
appeared to be concerned with the same inquiry as that which
would take place under the Code, namely whether the description of
the land reasonably identified it, and the decision would probably
be unaffected by the Code. The North Carolina court also held
valid a mortgage on "My entire crop of Irish and sweet potatoes,
corn, etc., grown in the year 1916 on the lands of Thomas Harris,
being one-half of the crop grown on said land."73 If "my own
land" is a sufficient identification, it follows that "the lands of
Thomas Harris" is likewise sufficient. The court also held that
the description included crops besides the potatoes and corn. These
were included by the term "etc." and the language, "one-half of
SoG.S. § 25-9-203(1) (b).1W. L. Hurley & Sons v. Ray, 160 N.C. 376, 76 S.E. 234 (1912).
"Weil v. Flowers, 109 N.C. 212, 13 S.E. 761 (1891). In Woodlief v.
Harris, 95 N.C. 211 (1886), the court held sufficient the description, "all
crops raised on lands owned . . . by me, during the present year ...
Id. at 212.
"' Gallop v. Elizabeth City Milling Co., 178 N.C. 1, 100 S.E. 130 (1919).
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the crop." A mortgage on the mortgagor's "entire crop of cotton
to be arised by me or my tenants on all my lands during the year
1899" was held, as against a subsequent mortgagee, to include cot-
ton grown on land claimed by the mortgagor as his, and on which
he had lived for fifteen years, even though, after the mortgage was
made and registered a court held that the mortgagor did not own
the lands. The court said that the purpose of the description was
to identify the lands, and this was accomplished,74 thus applying
the same test as that later established in the Code.
A security interest which does not meet the Code requirements75
is not enforceable, even against the debtor, and cannot be made so
on any theory of equitable mortgage.76 The theory of equitable
mortgage to the extent that it allowed creditors to enforce informal
security agreements against debtors7 7 may well have developed to
escape elaborate formal requirements for mortgages. Since the Code
reduces formal requirements to what is thought to be a necessary
minimum, there is no longer a need for the equitable mortgage
doctrine.7 The Code provision prescribing this minimum is a vari-
ety of Statute of Frauds.79
The definition of "security agreement" is "an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest."8" For this reason it is
stated in the official comment that the requirement that there be a
security agreement "is not intended to reject, and does not reject,
the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale although absolute in
form may be shown to have been in fact given as a security."'"
This may be shown by parol evidence.82 Perhaps the reasoning is
that, since under prior law an absolute bill of sale shown to have
been given as a security created a security, it is "an agreement which
' Brown v. Miller, 108 N.C. 395, 13 S.E. 167 (1891). In Furgerson v.
Twisdale, 137 N.C. 414, 49 S.E. 914 (1905), the court looked to a number
of factors in determining that a mortgage by two mortgagors on "all crops
cultivated by us" on designated lands did not include a crop cultivated on
the lands by one only of the mortgagors. Id. at 415, 49 S.E. at 914.
" G.S. § 25-9-203(1) (b).
7" G.S. § 25-9-203, comment 5.
"' 1 JONEs § 13 sets forth various informal agreements which were held
on equitable grounds to be mortgages. The test of the validity of these under
the Code would be whether they complied with the requirements of UCC §
9-203.
"' G.S. § 25-9-203, comment 5.70 Ibid.
so G.S. § 25-9-105(1)(h).




creates or provides for a security interest" under the Code defini-
tion of "security agreement." Or the official comment may have
been based on the Code definition stating that "agreement" means
the bargain of the parties as found in their language or by implica-
tion from other circumstances, 3 but no mention of this was made
in the official comment relative to absolute bills of sale as security.8 4
If the prior law was imported into the Code to determine when
an absolute bill of sale created a security, the result may be un-
fortunate from the standpoint of the purpose of the Code to bring
about uniformity in the law, 5 since the prior law was not uniform
in the matter. In some states the ground for admission of parol
evidence to prove the absolute bill of sale to be a mortgage is fraud,
accident or mistake, although the better and more generally accepted
rule in the United States is that parol evidence may be admitted
simply to show intent.8 6 The result will be especially unfortunate
in North Carolina since this state adheres to the minority rule. It
has been held that an absolute deed of personal property cannot
be converted into a security without a showing of fraud, imposition,
oppression or mistake.8 7 Moreover, the intent that the absolute deed
be a security must be shown by facts and circumstances "de hors
the deed" incompatible with an absolute purchase. Parol evidence
that a mortgage was intended is insufficient.88
The usual rule in other jurisdictions is that all the attendant
circumstances may be considered for the purpose of ascertaining
the intent, such as the declarations of the parties, the existence of
a previous debt from vendor to vendee, the seeking of a loan by
83G.S. § 25-1-201(3).
G.S. § 25-9-203, comment 4.
G.S. § 25-1-102(2) (c).
1 JONES § 23.
"Whitfield v. Cates, 59 N.C. 136 (1860).
" Colvard v. Waugh, 56 N.C. 335 (1857). The two cited North Caro-
lina cases on absolute bills of sale of personal property as mortgages seem
to be taking the same direction as the cases on absolute deeds of real
property as mortgages. The real property cases have crystalized tvo re-
quirements for holding an absolute deed to be a mortgage. First it must
be proved that the defeasance clause was omitted by reason of ignorance,
mistake, fraud or undue advantage. Second, the intent to create a security
must be shown by proof, not merely of declarations, but of facts de hors
(outside) the deed, inconsistent with an absolute purchase. Poston v. Bowen,
228 N.C. 202, 44 S.E.2d 881 (1947); Newbern v. Newbern, 178 N.C. 3, 100
S.E. 77 (1919). The North Carolina position is criticized in 26 N.C.L. Rnv.
405 (1948). This note brings out that all other states seem to have aban-
doned the first requirement and require nothing beyond sufficient proof of
intent.
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the vendor from the vendee, the disproportionately greater value of
the property as compared with the amount received, the continued
possession of the property by the grantor, and his delay in assert-
ing that the transaction was a mortgage.89
Since the North Carolina position requiring more than a show-
ing of intent in order to have an absolute bill of sale declared to
be a security represents a view abandoned in most other states and
imposes on the debtor a requirement of proof that he commonly
cannot meet,"0 it would seem that the North Carolina court for the
sake of uniformity with other states in the law of secured transac-
tions on personal property might well abandon its more stringent
requirements. However, the problem may not arise often. So far
as cases reaching the supreme court of the state are any indica-
tion, absolute bills of sale of personalty are not much used in North
Carolina. No case since 1860 involving such a device has been found.
Moreover, simply determining that an absolute bill of sale will
be held to be a security agreement if such intent can be shown is
not in itself a satisfactory solution of the problem. Of course a
purpose of such a rule is to enable the debtor to show that the bill
of sale was a security and enable him to redeem his property. To
that extent it prevents oppression of the debtor. But an undesirable
result is that under the Code a writing can be established as a
security agreement even though the writing itself does not purport
to create a security interest. After all, if a security is intended why
should the writing not so state? Absolute transfers are a deceptive
and undesirable form of security and are likely to be exacted by
creditors from needy debtors." Perhaps the best solution would be
for the several states to enact a statute making absolute bills of
sale intended as security void, thus eliminating their use and avoid-
ing what seems to be an undesirable result under the Code.9
2
11 1 JoNas § 24. The factors having a bearing on intent of the parties to
create a security in the case of deeds to realty are listed in 16 N.C.L. REv.
416 (1938). They would seem to be equally applicable in the case of
absolute bills of sale of personal property.
" This point is brought out in connection with absolute deeds of realty
intended as security in 26 N.C.L. Rav. 405 (1948).
01 Ibid.
"Absolute deeds of real estate intended as mortgages are, in North
Carolina, void as to the debtor's other creditors and subsequent purchasers
from him. Foster v. Moore, 204 N.C. 9, 167 S.E. 383 (1933); Gulley v.
Macy, 84 N.C. 434 (1881). The rule making such deeds void as to the
grantor debtor's other creditors is discussed in 26 N.C.L. Rzv. 405 (1948).
[Vol. 44
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
V. WHAT IS A PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST?
Under the law prior to the Code, security given for purchase
money sometimes had a priority which would not otherwise have
been given. For example, if a security-covered property to be ac-
quired by the debtor in the future, a purchase-money security given
on the property when later acquired would prevail over the earlier
after-acquired property security."3 Under the Code also, certain
priorities are given purchase-money security interests. 4 This makes
it necessary to determine what constitutes a purchase-money secu-
rity interest, and the Code states that a security interest is a pur-
chase-money security interest to the extent that it is -taken or
retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price. 5 This is the usual concept of a purchase-money security.
The Code adds a security interest taken by a person who by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor
to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact
so used. 6 North Carolina has already held that the priority given
a purchase-money security applies where the security is given one
who advances money to the vendee to pay on the purchase price.9"
The cases involved real estate security, but on this point there is
no apparent reason to distinguish real from personal property.9"
VI. BULK TRANSFER PROVISIONS INAPPLICABLE
The North Carolina Bulk Sales Act,99 which by its terms applies
only to a "sale in bulk," has been held inapplicable to a security
for a present consideration.'00 The Code goes farther and specifi-
cally provides that the creation of a security interest is not a bulk
" Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar, 214 N.C. 85, 197 S.E. 698
(1938); Standard Dry-Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N.C. 481, 90 S.E. 564
(1916); 17 N.C.L. REv. 442 (1939).. A case decided under the Code
adhered to the same rule. Blancob Constr. Corp. v. 246 Beaumont Equity,
Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 413, 261 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1965).
"' G.S. § 25-9-107, comment 1.
, G.S. § 25-9-107 (a).
G.S. § 25-9-107(b).
Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E.2d
431 (1949); Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Brock, 196 N.C. 24, 144 S.E.
365 (1928); 7 N.C.L. REv. 95 (1928). OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 555 (1951)
states the same rule.
98 G.S. § 25-9-107, N.C. comment.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (Supp. 1965).
..0 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 253 N.C. 100, 116 S.E.2d
491 (1960).
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transfer under Article 6,101 the portion of the Code dealing with
bulk transfers. When the Code goes into effect in North Carolina,
its Bulk Sales Act will be repealed,1"2 Article 6 will replace it, and
security transactions will not be required to comply with the pro-
visions of that article.
VII. LANDLORD'S LIEN ON CROPS
In North Carolina by statute a landlord is given a lien on the
crops raised on the land for rent and advancements made and ex-
penses incurred in making the crops, which lien is preferred to all
other liens. 013 Since Article 9 of the Code provides that the article
does not apply to a landlord's lien,'0 4 the priority of that lien is pre-
served. 05 It has been held that the provision of the Code excluding
a landlord's lien from its provisions applies to landlord's liens cre-
ated by statute and not to a lien given by the terms of a lease.'0°
VIII. APPLICATION TO LEASES INTENDED AS SECURITY
Under prior law, transactions nominally leases of personal prop-
erty were held to be conditional sales if they were such in substance
and included all the incidents of conditional sales such as install-
ment payments which, though nominally rent, were absolutely pay-
able in totals equalling the value of the goods and which entitled
the buyer to full ownership on completion of the payments or on
some nominal payment in addition.0 7 Such a transaction was held
101 G.S. § 25-9-111. A parallel provision to the same effect is made in
G.S. § 25-6-103(1).
02 G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
10' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-15 (1950); Eason v. Dew, 244 N.C. 571, 94
S.E.2d 603 (1956).
21 G.S. § 25-9-104(b).
10. In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd,
272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959). The court held that since Article 9 does not
apply to a landlord's lien its previous priority under the law of Pennsylvania
was undisturbed, with the result that in a bankruptcy proceeding the land-
lord's lien took priority over a perfected security interest in inventory.
10 In re King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
The court reasoned that a statutory landlord's lien fits in with the exclusion
policy embodied in the various exceptions listed in UCC § 9-104, whereas
a contract lien given a landlord does not.
"'VOLD, SALES 326 (2d ed. 1959). The UNIFORm CONDITIONAL SALES
AcT § 1(2) included in the definition of conditional sale "any contract for
the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to
pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the goods,
and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or
has the option of becoming the owner of such goods upon full compliance
with the terms of the contract."
[Vol. 44
19661 SECURED TRANSACTIONS 733
to be a conditional sale in North Carolina.0 Article 9 of the Code
applies to security interests created by contract including "lease or
consignment intended as security."' 9 Article 1 includes in the
definition of "security interest" a provision, "Whether a lease is
intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case;
however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agree-
ment that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee
shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property
for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does
make the lease one intended for security."" This language would
seem to incorporate the prior rule that in order for the lease to be
held to be a conditional sale (security), the lease must bind the
lessee to make payments substantially equal to the purchase price."'
However, it has been held pursuant to these Code provisions that
even where the lessee does not bind himself to lease the property
long enough for the payments he is obliged to make to equal more
than a small fraction of the purchase price, still the lease is a securi-
ty agreement and subject to Code provisions as such.1' 2 The de-
cision seems wrong. The lessee "upon compliance with the terms
of the lease" did not become or have the option of becoming the
owner for no additional consideration or for a nominal considera-
tion. He apparently bound himself to lease the compressor involved
for no more than one month, for which the rent was 800 dollars.
The purchase price if the lessee purchased was 14,500 dollars. The
lessee could lease for a period long enough so that applied rent
payments would pay for the compressor, but it seems that the lessee
did not bind itself to do so. The lessee could "comply with the
terms of the lease" by keeping the compressor one month and pay-
... Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N.C. 279, 56 S.E. 929 (1907). In United
States Leasing Corp. v. Hall, 264 N.C. 110, 141 S.E.2d 30 (1965), the
court held the lease of a duplicating machine not to be a conditional sale,
but in that case the lessee had expressed a preference to rent the equipment
rather than purchase it, and the lease so far as appears, contained no option
to buy but rather provided for the return of the machine at the end of the
five-year lease period.
'109 G.S. § 25-9-102(2).
110 G.S. § 25-1-201(37).
... See notes 107 and 108 supra.
.. United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 231
Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963). The lease being held to be a security
agreement, it was invalid against a subsequent execution creditor of the
lessee for lack of compliance with the Code's filing provisions.
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ing one month's rent, but this plainly did not give the lessee the
right to become the owner for no additional consideration or a
nominal one."1 It is doubtful that the Code provision that the
intent is to be determined by the facts of each case justifies going
as far as did this decision.
Assuming that the decision is wrong, should other courts follow
it for the sake of uniformity? Is the first court to apply a Code
provision in a particular kind of case to preclude other courts from
making up their own minds? Of course such an initial decision
should have especial weight because to depart from it would impair
a major purpose of the Code-uniformity. Nevertheless, initial de-
cisions which are plainly bad ought to be rejected by other courts.
The resultant doubt as to the correct interpretation of the Code
could normally be cleared up by amendment.'14
In accord with prior law as well as the Code provisions is a
decision holding a lease of machinery with an option to purchase
not to be a security agreement under the Code where if the option
were exercised, besides rent a payment of twenty-five per cent of the
purchase price was required. This twenty-five per cent would
amount to 2,006.25 dollars, and this, the court, said was not a
nominal consideration." 5
IX. WHEN SECURITY INTEREST ATTACHES-AFTER-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY
The common-law rule was that a mortgage can operate only on
property in existence when the mortgage was given and then be-
longing to the mortgagor or potentially belonging to him. A mort-
gage of goods which the mortgagor did not own, though he after-
wards acquired them, was void as against subsequent purchasers
from, or attaching creditors of, the mortgagor taking after the
property was acquired."' Nevertheless, a mortgagor could mortgage
goods which he had potentially, as where he had land or animals
...A referee in bankruptcy likewise held a lease with an option to pur-
chase, but no obligation to lease long enough to make up the purchase price,
to create a security interest under the Code and laid down the test of whether
the lessee acquires an equity in the property by making any rent payments.
It re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC REPORTING SERV. 342 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
27, 1963).
1.. See UCC, 1962 Official Text XI-XV, especially XIV SEVENTH (b),
Appendix.
In re Wheatland Elec. Prods. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
11 1 JONES § 138.
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and mortgaged their future product." 7 An otherwise invalid after-
acquired property mortgage could be made good by some new act
to bring the property under the mortgage after the property was
acquired. 118 However, in equity a mortgage on after-acquired prop-
erty was good even against purchasers and lien creditors of the
mortgagor and took effect when the property was acquired without
any new act to bring the property under the mortgage."' This
latter rule is followed in North Carolina."2 The North Carolina
statute on factors' liens also makes provision that the lien is good
on after-acquired property from the time of filing notice,' the
statute on assignment of accounts receivable includes accounts aris-
ing under future contracts, 2 and the statute providing an agri-
cultural lien for advances covers crops made within one year from
the date of the agreement.123 These statutes, supplanted by the Code,
indicate long-standing North Carolina policy.
The Code provides that a security interest cannot attach until
three requirements are fulfilled. These are first, that there is agree-
ment that it attach, second, that value is given, and third, that the
debtor has rights in the collateral. As soon as these three occur,
the security interest does attach unless explicit agreement postpones
the time of attaching.
124
Where the debtor does not have rights in the collateral at the
time of the security agreement, the security interest cannot then
attach, since the third of the three requirements is lacking. But
when the debtor does obtain rights in the collateral the security
interest then attaches, the other two requisites being present, since
then all three conditions of attaching are met.
Thus the Code provides for security interests in after-acquired
property together with the limitation that the security interest can-
not attach to the property until the debtor has rights in it. There
must be a bird in hand before the security interest attaches, and
..Id. at § 140; Woodlief v. Harris, 95 N.C. 211 (1886).
1181 JONES §§ 158-69; 8 COLUm. L. REv. 307 (1908).
11 1 JONEs § 170. The leading case is Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H.L. 191,
11 Eng. Rep. 999 (1861).
... Standard Dry-Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N.C. 481, 90 S.E. 564 (1916),
citing Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H.L. 191, 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (1861); Hickson
Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N.C. 282, 63 S.E. 1045 (1909);
G.S. § 25-9-204, N. C. comment.
"I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-71 (Supp. 1965).
1"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-77(1) (a) (Supp. 1965).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-52 (Supp. 1965).
184 G.S. § 25-9-204(1).
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then it does though the bird was not in hand when the security
agreement was made.
Recognition of security interests on after-acquired property is
also found in a provision that, with certain exceptions, a security
agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall se-
cure all obligations covered by the security agreement. 2 5
As to when the debtor is deemed to have rights in the collateral,
express provisions are made for certain types of cases. For the pur-
poses of the section on when the security interest attaches he has
no rights in crops until they are planted or otherwise become grow-
ing crops, in the young of livestock until they are conceived, in fish
until caught, in oil, gas, or minerals until they are extracted, in
timber until it is cut, in a contract right until the contract has been
made, nor in an account until it comes into existence. 12 6
The Code provisions on security interests in after-acquired prop-
erty discussed above thus appear to be in accord with prior North
Carolina law. They spell out in more detail when the security inter-
est attaches.
It is provided, with one type of exception, that no security inter-
est attaches under an after-acquired property clause to crops which
become such more than one year after the security agreement is
executed. 27 This will expand to security interests on crops general-
ly the prior North Carolina statutory limitation on agricultural
liens for advances to crops made within one year. 28 The Code
also provides that no security interest attaches under an after-ac-
quired property clause to consumer goods, other than accessions
when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights
in them within ten days after the secured party gives value' 29 This
limitation appears to change to that extent the North Carolina
law.13 0
After-acquired property mortgages frequently present the prob-
lem of sufficiency of the description of such property. Broad general
descriptions have been held valid in North Carolina, for example, a
G.S. § 25-9-204(3).
12 G.S. § 25-9-204(2).
127G.S. § 25-9-204(4) (a).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-52 (Supp. 1965).
G.S. § 25-9-204(4) (b).
G.S. § 25-9-204, N.C. comment. No such limitation appeared in Twin
City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E. 461 (1929).
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designated car "and all additions and improvements thereto."' 1 An
even broader description held sufficient was, "Also all the property,
real, personal, or mixed, wheresoever the same is situated, now
owned by the Gay Lumber Company, or shall be owned during
the continuance of the liability hereinafter mentioned."'' 2 The court
said that from its very nature such a clause cannot describe with
accuracy the property which the mortgagor will acquire since it is
unknown.
Such descriptions would seem to be equally valid under the
Code. Pursuant to the Code the following description in a chattel
mortgage was sustained: "our complete inventory of all parts and
accessories now owned or which may hereafter be acquired." The
court said that the description reasonably identified the motor parts
and accessories in the mortgagor automobile dealer's inventory.133
Another security agreement described the collateral as "inventory
of merchandise to be maintained in an amount not less that $10,000
... at seller's wholesale cost, contained in the Kiddy and Women's
Wear Shop," etc. The court held this to be a sufficient description of
the entire inventory. The provision that the inventory was to be
maintained at a certain value meant that items added in the future
were to be included. Since the description applied to the entire in-
ventory, there was no problem of identifying the goods intended to
be included.'3 4
X. USE OR DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL WITHOUT
ACCOUNTING
Under the Code a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent
against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use or dispose
of it without accounting for its proceeds or replacing it.' 35 This
181 Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E.
461 (1929).
.8 Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay"Lumber Co., 150 N.C. 282, 63 S.E.
1045 (1909).
188 Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D.
Pa. 1962).
134 In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 160 (E.D. Pa. May 1,
1964). 'In National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., Inc., 346 Mass.
255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963), it was held that a description "All contents of
luncheonette including equipment such as:" then naming items, covers the
contents and is not limited to the named items. Id. at 259, 191 N.E.2d at
473. Further, the disputed after-acquired cash register also was covered by
other terms in the description.18 G.S. § 25-9-205.
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changes the rule of cases like Benedict v. Ratner,3 ' which held such
security interests fraudulent and void as to the debtor's other
creditors. 3 7 The Code provision will likewise overturn the North
Carolina holding that a mortgage on a stock of goods left in the
possession of the mortgagor which contains no provision for an
account of sales and application of the proceeds to the debt is pre-
sumptively fraudulent as to existing creditors, but not subsequent
creditors of or purchasers from the mortgagor. 38 Under the Code
there would be no such presumption of fraud as to anyone. The
North Carolina statute on assignments of accounts receivable re-
sembles the Code in that it provides, "Any permission by the as-
signee to the assignor to exercise dominion and control over a
protected assigned account or the proceeds thereof shall not invali-
date the assignment as to third persons.' 1 9  But although the
validity of the assignment was saved, probably the dominion of the
assignor over the proceeds was not, since the statute also provides
that the assignor shall hold in trust for the assignee the proceeds
of an assigned account.""
XI. FUTURE ADVANCES
The Code provision on security for future advances is short and
to the point. "Obligations covered by a security agreement may
...268 U.S. 353 (1925). The Court applied the law of New York.
110 G.S. § 25-9-205, comment 1. In the case of In re United Thrift Stores,
Inc., 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 864 (D.N.J. June 24, 1965), the court com-
mented that under the Code there is no requirement of "policing" the
collateral by the secured party.
"'A. Blanton Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 162 N.C. 307, 78 S.E. 276 (1913);
G.S. § 25-9-205, N.C. comment. In Messick v. Fries, 128 N.C. 450, 39 S.E.
59 (1901), the court held valid as to subsequent creditors a mortgage on
a stock of goods with authority in the mortgagor to sell apparently with-
out accounting to the mortgagee, in the absence of proof of actual fraud,
and indicated an inconsistency in the North Carolina cases on the validity
of such mortgages against creditors. In Merchants & Farmers Bank v.
Pearson, 186 N.C. 609, 120 S.E. 210 (1923), a registered mortgage on
lumber at described locations which specified that the mortgagor agreed
to keep not less than 500,000 board feet of lumber at said locations during
the life of the mortgage was held valid in the absence of proof of fraud
against a purchaser on execution sale although all the lumber on hand at
the time of the mortgage had been sold and replaced by other lumber. The
court did not say whether the execution creditor became a creditor prior
or subsequent to the mortgage.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-83 (1950).
"'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-84(2) (a) (1950). Of course this assignment




include future advances or other value whether or not the advances
or value are given pursuant to commitment." '141 Previous law con-
cerning mortgages to secure future advances was complicated. Such
mortgages were held valid as against subsequent liens if the ad-
vances were obligatory, superior to liens accruing after optional
advances were made, superior to liens accruing before optional ad-
vances were made if no notice was had by the mortgagee of the
intervening lien, and inferior to liens of which the mortgagee had
actual notice to the extent of optional advances made thereafter.
If the optional advances were made after only constructive notice
of intervening liens, there was a split of authority.'" The North
Carolina law on the subject was fragmentary. A few cases involv-
ing real estate recognized the validity of mortgages to secure future
advances, but did not distinguish between the types of situations just
indicated. 4 3 The North Carolina statute on agricultural liens in-
cludes future advances,14 as does the factor's lien statute.'45
XII. SECURITY INTERESTS ON SHIFTING STOCKS OF GOODS
The Code provisions on after-acquired property security inter-
ests plus the provision validating security interests where the debtor
has the right to dispose of the collateral without accounting validate
what has been called the floating charge or lien on a shifting stock.' 40
In a Kentucky case the court held that a chattel mortgage on a
changing stock of goods was invalid, the case being governed by
prior Kentucky law, but added that it was comforted by the knowl-
edge that the Code, in effect in the state by the time of the court's
decision, permits mortgages on after-acquired property. 47 When
the Code's flat authorization of security agreements to secure future
advances is added, the result is to validate security interests on shift-
141 G.S. § 25-9-204(5).
142 31 N.C.L. REv. 504 (1953); 6 VA. L. REv. 280 (1919). For a dis-
cussion of the priorities under the Code of future advances over intervening
liens see Smith, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfection and Priori-
ties, 44 N.C.L. REv. 753.
14" McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N.C. 494, 83 S.E. 623 (1914);
Todd, Schenck & Co. v. Outlaw, 79 N.C. 234 (1878); Moore v. Ragland,
74 N.C. 343 (1876).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-52 (Supp. 1965), repealed when the Code goes
into effect. G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-71(3) (Supp. 1965), repealed when the Code
goes into effect. G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
1' G.S. § 25-9-204, comment 3.
"'Phelps v. Turner, 351 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1961).
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ing stocks of goods to secure loans or value given or to be given
over a future course of dealing. 4 Therein, the North Carolina
statute on factors' liens,'40 within its more restricted area, resembles
the results under the Code.
XIII. AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT DEFENSES AGAINST
ASSIGNEE
Clauses are frequently inserted in conditional sales contracts by
which the vendee agrees not to assert against an assignee of the
contract defenses the vendee may have against the vendor. The
prior law as to the validity of such clauses is in confusion. In
some jurisdictions the clauses are held void as attempts to make
the conditional sales contracts into negotiable instruments, or as be-
ing contrary to public policy.5 0 A contrary policy was expressed
by a New York court which said that if effect were not given to
such provisions, it would be impossible for banks to finance install-
ment purchases, 5' and in the same state such a provision was en-
forced against both the buyer and its guarantors to prevent them
from raising against a good faith assignee of conditional sales con-
tracts of laundry equipment defenses based on the malfunctioning
of the equipment.8 2 Most American courts enforce such clauses. 3
No North Carolina decisions on this matter have been found. 54
Section 9-206 of the Code provides that an agreement by a buyer
or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforce-
able by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense.' 5 It has been held
under this provision that an assignee of a conditional sale is not
1,, G.S. § 25-9-204, N.C. comment. For a discussion of a hypothetical
security agreement under the Code covering present and future assets to
secure future advances, with the right in the debtor to dispose of the col-
lateral without accounting, see Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Se-
cured Transactions Under the Code, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 685, 693 (1962).
"'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 to -76 (Supp. 1965), repealed when the
Code goes into effect. G.S. § 25-10-102(1).100 G.S. § 25-9-206, comment 1.
"0 National State Bank v. Dzurita, 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 728 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. April 13, 1965).
'B.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Richmond, 46 Misc. 2d 447, 259 N.Y.S.2d
965 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1" G.S. § 25-9-206, N.C. comment.
104 Ibid.
100 G. S. § 25-9-206(1). The Code provision was applied in First Nat'l
Bank v. Husted, 2 UCC REPORTING Smv. 777 (I11. App. April 2, 1965).
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entitled to summary judgment dismissing an action for cancellation
where the conditional vendee contended that the baler sold was de-
fective and did not comply with warranties and denied that the
assignee took without notice of this claim against the conditional
vendor.:' An exception to the above Code provision making en-
forceable the agreement not to assert defenses against an assignee
is made in the case of defenses good against a holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Code. 5 ' Other-
wise put, the clause in the security agreement does not make such a
writing more negotiable than a negotiable instrument. Moreover
the opening language of section 9-206 leaves room for a further
exception. The language is, "Subject to any statute or decision
which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods . . . ." Under this provision a state statute or court decision
could, in the case of sales or leases of consumer goods, make invalid
an agreement by the buyer or lessee not to enforce his defenses
against an assignee. Such a statute or decision might be founded on
a desire to protect such buyers against financing institutions taking
assignments of conditional sales or purchase-money chattel mort-
gages.1 5
8
Section 9-206 also provides that a buyer who as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agree-
ment thereby makes an agreement that he will not assert against
an assignee his claims or defenses against the seller or lessor. Thus
the negotiable instrument imparts some of its character to the ac-
companying security agreement.
XIV. WHAT LAW GOVERNS
Under Code section 9-102 it is provided that except as otherwise
provided in section 9-103 on multiple state transactions and in sec-
tion 9-104 on excluded transactions, Article 9 applies so far as con-
cerns any personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of
this state. That amounts to saying, in most cases, that Article 9
applies when the collateral is physically located in this state.'59 Sec-
tion 9-103 then states special rules in certain situations. This sec-
tion is complicated and detailed, but the gist is as follows:
.. McCoy v. Mosley Mach. Co., 33 F.R.D. 287 (E.D. Ky. 1963).
57 G.S. § 25-9-206(1).
... Some states have such statutes. G.S. § 25-9-206, comment 2.
2110 G.S. § 25-9-103, comment 1.
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Subsection '(1) relates to security interests in accounts and con-
tract rights and provides that the law of the state wherein the
assignor keeps his records concerning such accounts and contract
rights governs the validity and perfection of the security interest
and the possibility and effect of proper filing. Subsection (2) re-
lates to security interests in general intangibles and goods of a type
normally used in more than one jurisdiction if such goods are classi-
fied as equipment or classified as inventory by their being leased by
the debtdr to'others. Here the law of the state wherein is located
the chief place of business of the debtor governs validity, perfec-
tion, and the possibility and effect of proper filing. Subsection (3)
provides that if personal property other than that governed by sub-
sections (1) and (2) is already subject to a security interest when
it is brought into this state, the validity of the security interest in
this state is to be determined by the law (including the conflict of
laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the property was when the
security interest attached. But if the parties understood at the time
the security interest attached that the property would be kept in
this state and it was brought here within thirty days after the secu-
rity interest attached for purposes other than transportation through
this state, then the law of this state determines the validity of the
security interest in this state.
It is to be noted that thus far subsection (3) is concerned with
what law governs the validity of the security interest, not what law
governs the steps necessary to make it effective against other parties.
Subsection (3) proceeds by providing that if the security interest
was already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the
property was when the security interest attached and before being
brought into this state, it continues perfected in this state for four
months, and also thereafter if within the four months, it is per-
fected here. It may be perfected here after the four months, in
which case perfection dates from the time of the perfection here.
If the security interest was not perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest at-
tached and before being brought into this state, it may be perfected
in this state and the perfection dates from that time.
Subsection (4) provides that notwithstanding subsections (2)
and (3), if a certificate of title to the property is issued under a
statute of this state or any other jurisdiction which requires indica-
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tion on a certificate of title of any security interest in the property
as a condition of perfection, then perfection is governed by the law
of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate. An obvious applica-
tion is to motor vehicles.'60
Subsection (5) relates to the situation in which the assignor
of accounts or contract rights keeps his records concerning them in
an office that is located in a foreign country.
Subsection (1) will replace the present statutory provision as
to when an account is deemed located in this state.0 1 This provision
is part of a statute which the Code repeals.' 62 Although neither is
mentioned in the repealer provisions of Article 10, the present North
Carolina statute relating to liens on personal property created in
another state'6 and the statute relating to security interests on motor
vehicles when brought into the state"M cover the same ground as
Code section 9-103 and appear to be supplanted.
A number of cases in Code jurisdictions have involved this sec-
tion. A Pennsylvania case involved the application of section 9-
103(1). A debtor made a contract with the United States govern-
ment for maintenance, repair and overhaul of vehicles and assigned
to an agent of a lender the payments due or to become due under
the contract. The court sustained the assignment against a receiver
of the debtor. One question in the case arose out of a stipulation
in the agreement with the lender that the agreement and its per-
formance were to be governed by the laws of New York, and that
under what is now section 1-105(1) of the Code the parties could
stipulate that the laws of that other state (New York) "shall govern
their rights and duties." But the court held that the Pennsylvania
law governed because the case involved not just the rights and
duties of the parties but of creditors also, and the applicable section
was what is now 9-103(1), providing that in the case of assign-
ment of accounts the validity and perfection of the security interest
is determined by the law of the state in which is located the office
where the assignor keeps his records concerning them. Otherwise
... North Carolina statutes provide for entry of security interests on
motor vehicle title certificates, and make such entry adequate notice to all
creditors and purchasers. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-58(a)-(b), 20-58.1, -58.2
(1965). 40 N.C.L. REv. 84 (1961).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-78(5) (1950).
102 G.S. § 25-10-102(1).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38.1 (Supp. 1965).
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58(c) (1965). Some of the language of this
statute is the same as that in G.S. § 25-9-103.
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it would be possible for two parties to render nugatory as to third
parties an act of the legislature passed for the benefit of the third
parties.105
Section 9-103(3) was applied in a case in which a chattel deed
of trust on equipment was made in West Virginia and filed in that
state. The equipment was moved to Pennsylvania, a Code state, but
the deed of trust was not properly filed there. The court decided
that the creditor holding the deed of trust did not have a secured
claim in the debtor's reorganization proceeding under Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act. Under Code section 9-103(3) the security
interest perfected in West Virginia continued perfected for four
months on removal to Pennsylvania, but the four months had ex-
pired at the time of the petition for reorganization.' 6"
A conditional sale made in Rhode Island but not recorded there
since no recordation was required was held by a New York court
to be "perfected" in Rhode Island, so that it was good for four
months after the car involved was removed to Pennsylvania, a Code
state, and successive sales of the car in Pennsylvania during that
period were held by the New York court to be subordinate to the
Rhode Island conditional sale.' 67
A conditional sale was also held perfected at a time when it
was unfiled in a case where the conditional sale of a car was made
in New York, and the car was on the same day sold by the vendee
to A, who, also on the same day, took it to Pennsylvania, a Code
state, and sold it to B, who on the next day sold it to C, who ob-
tained a Pennsylvania title certificate. Seven days after the original
conditional sale was made in New York, it was filed there. A
Pennsylvania court held the conditional sale valid against the Penn-
sylvania purchasers since under the New York law if the conditional
sale is filed within ten days, as it was here, it is valid from the time
made as against lienholders and purchasers; therefore it was per-
fected under the New York law at the time of the Pennsylvania
sales although not filed in New York until after the sales. The
"" Industrial Packaging Prod. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
... In re Dumont-Airplane & Marine Instruments, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). A conditional sale made and duly recorded in another
state was held perfected in Pennsylvania when resold there within four
months. Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 2 UCC
REPORTING SERV. 595 (Pa. Super. March 18, 1965).
1. Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560,
229 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962).
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court then applied Code section 9-103(3), making the conditional
sale perfected in New York continue perfected in Pennsylvania for
four months.
68
Where a conditional sale of a car was made in the District of
Columbia and the car was removed to Massachusetts where it was
repossessed and sold, although the validity of the conditional sale,
under Code section 9-103(3), is determined by the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia where the security interest attached, the Code,
effective in Massachusetts, governs the resale, and the required no-
tice of such sale not having been given pursuant to Code section
9-504(3), the resale was illegal, and New York will not grant
recovery of any alleged deficiency.6
PART FIVE: DEFAULT
I. SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO TAKE POSSESSION
AFTER DEFAULT
The right to possession of collateral under prior North Carolina
law varied with the kind of security agreement. In the case of
chattel mortgages, North Carolina being a title jurisdiction, the
mortgagee had the right to possession before and after default.170
Since in this state a conditional sale had the legal effect of a chattel
mortgage,' 7' the conditional vendor at one time also had the right
of possession before as well as after default." 2 This North Caro-
lina view that the conditional vendor was entitled to possession
even before default was opposed to the general understanding of
the commercial world that the conditional vendee has the right to
possession so long as he keeps up his payments and is not otherwise
in default' and was also opposed to the almost universal rule in
168 Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 195 Pa. Super. 344,
171 A.2d 813 (1961). Although A obtained a New York registration
certificate in his own name and assigned it to B, this did not affect the
case since New York did not require notation on the title certificate of the
conditional sale. Moreover, Pennsylvania did not then have what is now
Code § 9-103(4). Editor's Note, 1 UCC REPORTING SFRV. 382.
.. Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 2 UCC REPORTING SERv. 937
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. Aug. 10, 1965).
1. See note 40 supra.
""1 See note 19 supra.
1.2 State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1933); 12 N.C.L. Ray.
254 (1934); 11 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1933).
"1840 N.C.L. REv. 81 (1961).
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other jurisdictions.7 The result was the enactment of a statute
providing for the right to possession in the buyer before default in
the case of chattels sold on installment payments secured by con-
ditional sale, purchase-money chattel mortgage, chattel deed of trust,
or similar security on the article sold.' 7 5 The statute leaves un-
touched the chattel mortgagee's right to possession in chattel mort-
gages other than those in installment sales. Under the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act the entruster (secured creditor) has the right
to possession on default.'76
The Code sweeps away the diversity in the prior law as to the
right to possession by providing that unless otherwise agreed, a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateralY.7 7 This implies that before default the debtor has that
right unless agreed otherwise.' 78  The same section of the Code
further provides that in taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of
the peace, or may he proceed by action. This is in accord with the
prior North Carolina rule which allowed a conditional vendor to
take possession without legal process if done peaceably, 79 but North
Carolina has gone farther than the Code now does and has held
that if on repossession there is such a show of force as to create a
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person in possession
that he must yield to avoid a breach of the peace, and he does so
yield, this is forceable trespass."'
II. SALE OR DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL ON DEFAULT
The Code provides that on default the secured party has not
only the rights and remedies provided by the Code but also those
contained in the security agreement, except that certain of the Code
provisions may not be waived or varied. The secured party may
also reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce
1721 N.C.L. Rav. 387 (1943); 11 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1933).
175 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-3.1 (Supp. 1965).
170N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-51(a) (1950).
177 G.S. § 25-9-503.
'18 G.S. § 25-9-503, N.C. comment.
1' Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225
(1962).1' Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d
894 (1943); Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257,
171 S.E. 63 (1933). The matter of trespass in retaking is discussed in 30
N.C.L. REv. 149 (1952).
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the security interest by any available judicial procedure.18' The
provisions relating to rights and remedies on default apply to pledges
as well as other security interests.182 If a secured party reduces his
claim to judgment and levies execution on the collateral based on
the judgment, the lien relates back to the date of the perfection of
the security interest. A judicial sale pursuant to the execution is
a foreclosure by judicial procedure, and the secured party may pur-
chase at the sale.'
8 3
The Code further provides that after default a secured party may
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral and
apply the proceeds to the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding
and resale, then to the indebtedness, and then to subordinate securi-
ty interests if written notice of demand therefor is received and
reasonable proof of such interest is furnished on demand. The debtor
is entitled to any surplus and is liable for any deficiency. Disposi-
tion of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings.
8 4
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any
time and place and on any terms; but a basic requirement is made
that every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Provision
is made for prior notice of the sale or disposition to the debtor
and other holders of security interests.8 5 The secured party may
buy at any public sale, and if the collateral is of a type customarily
sold in a recognized market or is of a type subject to widely distrib-
uted standard price quotations, he may buy at private sale. The
purchaser at the sale or disposition takes the property free of the
security interest and subordinate security interests or liens.' 8 6
Inasmuch as the Code authorizes a sale or other disposition by
181 G.S. § 25-9-501 (1).
182 G.S. § 25-9-501, comment 2.
188 G.S. § 25-9-501(5). In North Carolina such execution on the mort-
gaged property by the mortgagee on a judgment for the amount of the
secured obligation is not allowed in the case of real estate. McPeters v.
English, 141 N.C. 491, 54 S.E. 417 (1906).
18 The provisions for private sale make possible disposal through reg-
ular commercial channels which frequently realize more on the collateral
for the benefit of all parties. G.S. § 25-9-504, comment 1.
'8 An exception is made where the collateral is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market. This exception does not apply to used cars
since they are subject to vacillation in pricing procedures, and the so-called
"red book"' purporting to fix prices according to year of manufacture is
not based on actual market prices. Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195
Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961).180 G.S. § 25-9-504.
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a secured party after default, there seems to be no further need for
the power of sale conferred on conditional vendors, chattel mort-
gagees or chattel trustees by a prior North Carolina statute.1 T
Chapter 45 of the General Statutes of North Carolina sets out
extensive provisions concerning mortgages, deeds of trust and con-
ditional sales. Article 2A of chapter 45 governs in detail sales under
power of sale contained in such instruments or provided by statute.
No provision-by-provision comparison of Part 5 of Article 9 of the
Code and article 2A of chapter 45 of the General Statutes is feasible
here. So far as the latter deals with personal property the survival
of its provisions is governed by the provision' that in case of con-
flict between chapter 45 of the General Statutes and Article 9 of the
Code, the latter governs all transactions subject thereto and chapter
45 shall be of no effect, except that any remedy given by chapter
45 to a secured party shall be cumulative with, but shall not restrict,
the rights and remedies granted by Article 9 of the Code.
Under prior North Carolina case law a chattel mortgagee was
not permitted to bid in at his own foreclosure sale. If he did he
was liable for damages. s9 Another decision held him liable for the
true value of the property.9 This law is replaced by the above
Code provision covering the subject.'
III. COMPULSORY DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL; ACCEP-
TANCE OF COLLATERAL AS DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATION
If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the case
of a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods or sixty
per cent of the loan in the case of a nonpurchase-money security
interest in such goods and has not signed after default a statement
renouncing his rights under Part 5 of the Code, a secured party
who has taken possession of the collateral must dispose of it under
the sale-or-disposition section. 92 If he fails to do so within ninety
days after he takes possession, the debtor at his option may recover
187 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.13 (1950).
288 G.S. § 25-10-105. A note to UCC § 9-102 recommends the repeal of
existing statutes dealing with conditional sales and chattel mortgages. This
recommendation was not followed in this state.28 Harris v. Hilliard, 221 N.C. 329, 20 S.E.2d 278 (1942).
0. Smith v. French, 152 N.C. 754, 67 S.E. 249 (1910).
10 G.S. § 25-9-504(3).
102 G.S. § 25-9-504.
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in conversion or under the section 193 on the secured party's liabili-
ty. 9
4
In any other case involving consumer goods or any other col-
lateral the secured party in possession may after default propose to
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation by written no-
tice to the debtor and in specified cases to other secured parties.
If written objection is made within thirty days from receipt of notifi-
cation by any party entitled to notice, or if any other secured party
objects in writing within thirty days after the secured party obtains
possession, the secured party must dispose of the collateral under
the sale-or-disposition section, otherwise the secured party may re-
tain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. 95
These provisions recognize the economic fact that the parties
are frequently better off without a resale'96 and may not want one.
Under prior North Carolina law, as under these Code provisions,
the debtor may elect to require a resale.'97 A provision in a pur-
chase-money mortgage of a piano that in case of default all pay-
ments may be retained by the mortgagee for the use of the piano
was held void since the mortgagee is entitled to interest but not
rent. The court ordered that the buyer pay the amount due, and if
not, that the piano be sold, the proceeds to be used to pay balance
and costs, the surplus, if any, to be paid the buyer.' Although
under the Code any such provision in a security agreement would
also seem to be void,"' the secured party might after default never-
theless retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation with the
concurrence of the debtor under one of the above provisions.
IV. DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO REDEEM
At any time before the secured party has disposed of the col-
lateral or made a contract for its disposal under the sale-or-disposi-
tion section 00 or before the obligation has been discharged by
"s G.S. § 25-9-507(1).
1' G.S. § 25-9-505(1).
"95 G.S. § 25-9-505(2).
'go G.S. § 25-9-505, comment 1.
'"Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N.C. 279, 56 S.E. 929 (1907); A. D.
Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N.C. 378, 17 S.E. 174 (1893).
... Chas. Hackley Piano Co. v. Kennedy, 152 N.C. 196, 67 S.E. 488
(1910).
G 1 .S. §§ 25-9-501(1), (3) (a); G.S. § 25-9-501, comment 4.200 G.S. § 25-9-504.
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retention of the collateral,2 ' the debtor or any other secured party
may, unless otherwise agreed in writing, after default redeem the
collateral by tendering the amount of the secured obligations and
expenses. 0 -
This Code provision contains the same principle as does the
prior North Carolina statute on redemption prior to sale,203 but the
details are different. The Code provision would accordingly sup-
plant the statute. Prior cases also embodied the principle that the
debtor be allowed to redeem before sale.204
V. SECURED PARTY'S LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH PART FIVE
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accord with the provisions of Part 5, disposition may be ordered or
restrained on appropriate terms. If the nonconforming disposition
has already occurred, the debtor or any person entitled to notifica-
tion or whose security interest has been made known to the secured
party prior to the disposition may recover from the secured party
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of Part
5. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor may recover as
a minimum the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the princi-
pal amount of the debt, or the time-price differential plus ten per
cent of the cash price. 5
One requirement for a sale or disposition is that it must be
commercially reasonable. The fact that a better price could have
been obtained by sale at a different time or by a different method
is not alone enough to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party sells the col-
lateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or
if he sells at a price current in such market at the time of his sale
or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commer-
cial practices among dealers in the type of property sold, he has sold
,o, G.S. § 25-9-505(2).
,2 G.S. § 25-9-506.
10'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.20 (1950), concerning mortgages, deeds of
trust and conditional sales.
"' Chas. Hackley Piano Co. v. Kennedy, 152 N.C. 196, 67 S.E. 488





in a commercially reasonable manner. These principles apply also
to types of disposition other than sales. -0 6
In North Carolina where a car sold on conditional sale was
repossessed but the resale was not advertised as required by law
the buyer was held to be entitled to have the fair market value
determined and to recover any amount by which this exceeded the
balance due.' No minimum recovery as now provided by the Code
was indicated.
A number of cases involving repossession and resale under the
Code have been decided. In one of them a secured party on default
of the debtors retook the collateral, a mobile diner, by a claim and
delivery action in which it was contended that the required bond
did not comply with the applicable statute. An award to the debtor
of actual and punitive damages for the retaking was reversed. The
court pointed out that section 9-503 of the Code authorizes the
secured party on default to take possession by judicial action. The
question is whether the judicial action was so defective as to expose
the secured party to the damage claims asserted. If there was some
technical flaw in the claim and delivery sufficient to invalidate the
process, this did not afford a cause of action for taking the diner.
Under section 9-507(1) allowing recovery for "any loss caused by
a failure to comply" with the provisions of Part 5 of the Code,
"loss" refers to actual, not nominal, damages. There could be no
punitive damages since the secured party acted in good faith, and
no damages for loss to the business since the secured party was
entitled to take possession. Taking possession presupposes termina-
tion of the business. However, the secured party must comply with
section 9-504(3), which requires that the sale or disposition of the
collateral be commercially reasonable. A new trial was granted to
determine whether this had been done, and if not, what damages
resulted from an improper sale.208
Several cases have involved failure to comply with section 9-
504(3) requiring prior notice to the debtor of the sale or disposi-
tion of the collateral. In one the defendants purchased an auto-
mobile on an installment sale contract and gave a judgment note,
which contract and note were assigned to the plaintiff. Plaintiff en-
20 G.S. § 25-9-507(2).
207 Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225
(1962).
... Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
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tered judgment on the note, retook the automobile, and sold it on
private sale for a grossly inadequate price. One of the defendants
petitioned to open the judgment, averring as a defense, inter alia,
that the plaintiff failed to give the defendant any notice of the sale
as required by section 9-504(3). It was contended, according to
the court, that the defendant was limited in her rights of action to
those set forth in section 9-504 (the court meant 9-507),"09 but the
court said that, while these rights are available to the defendant,
she is in no way limited in her means of exercising them, and the
court may, when a prima facie meritorious defense is shown, open
the judgment.210
Where an assignee of a vendor repossessed and resold without
the notice to the vendee, the court applied section 9-507 to justify
a counterclaim thereunder in an action for the balance due.21 1 Such
failure to comply with the notice of sale requirement has also been
held to preclude recovery for loss sustained by the secured party on
a resale. The debtor should have an opportunity to bid at the resale.
Also, a secured party who disposes of the collateral without notice
denies the debtor the right to redeem provided in section 9-506.212
'
0 0 Editor's Note, 1 UCC REPORTING SERv. 644.
210 Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548
(1961).
"
1 Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704(1960).
21. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D.
Pa. 1963). On appeal the holding on this point was undisturbed, but the
award of $50,000 punitive damages was eliminated. 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964).
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